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Must A Supreme Court Justice Refuse To
Answer Senators' Questions?
The squalid controversy surrounding the nomination of Mr. Justice
Fortas as Chief Justice of the United States seems now to be over.'
The Republican and southern Senators whose filibuster and vitriolic
attacks on the Court finally forced the Justice to withdraw his name
from consideration have won the victory, and for only the second time
in three-quarters of a century a presidential nomination to the Su-
preme Court has failed to receive the advice and consent of the Senate.
2
But if it is now settled that Mr. Justice Fortas will remain a mere Asso-
ciate Justice and that the unhappy Judge Thornberry will never ascend
from the purgatory of the Court of Appeals to the paradise of a seat
on the Supreme Court, the outcome of the struggle between Senators
and President has left a loose end or two lying about.3 The protracted
hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary4 raised serious
questions as to the duty of a judge nominated to a higher judicial post
not to answer questions from Senators relating to his opinions and legal
philosophy.
From very early on in the hearings, Senators Ervin and Thurmond-
1. President Johnson announced June 26, 1968 that he had accepted the retirement
of Chief Justice Warren, "effective at such time as a successor is qualified" and nominated
Mr. Justice Fortas to be the new Chief Justice. Judge Homer Thornberry, of the Fifth
Circuit, was to take the seat vacated by Mr. Justice Fortas. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1968,
at 1, col. 8; id. 30, col. 8. The Senate Judiciary Committee held protracted hearings ol
the nomination during July and September, before reporting it favorably on September
17th. SENATE COM.L ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ABE FORTAS, S. ExEc. REP. No. 8,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968); N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1968, at 1, col. 6. A filibuster on the
floor of the Senate prevented the nomination from coming to a vote, and when a motion
to obtain cloture had failed, Mr. Justice Fortas asked that his name be withdrawn from
consideration, to put an "end to destructive and extreme assaults upon the Court."
114 CONG. REc. S. 11688 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1968); id. S. 12051 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1968); N.Y.
Times, Oct. 3, 1968, at 1, col. 8; id. 42, col. 3.
2. Since 1895, President Hoover's nomination of Judge John J. Parker in 1930 had
been the only rejection of a Supreme Court nominee by the Senate. See pp. 702-03 & note
38 infra. The practice was much more common in the 19th century. During the period
1789-1894, more than a fifth of all presidential appointments to the Supreme Court
were either rejected or not acted upon. See J. HARRIS, TnE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE
SENATE 303 (1953); 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HisTony 757-62
(rev. ed. 1928).
3. Besides the matter discussed in this Note, the propriety of the Chief Justice's
manner of retiring was also called into question. See NEw REPUBLIC, July 20, 1968,
at 12.
4. See Hearings on Nomination of Abe Fortas, of Tennessee, to be Chief Justice of the
United States, and Nomination of Homer Thornberry, of Texas, to be Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1-2 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Fortas Hearings].
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who were opposed to confirmation-tried to get Mr. Justice Fortas to
discuss and defend various Supreme Court opinions of which they
disapproved. 5 They were interested, they said, in determining what the
Justice's "constitutional philosophy" was-how he would be likely to
decide cases and interpret the Constitution in the future.0 Some of the
cases they asked him about were ones in which he had participated;
others were earlier, decided before he joined the Court. But Mr.
Justice Fortas respectfully declined to answer any questions about the
meaning or basis of any Supreme Court opinion.
His position was an apparently simple one, and he stuck to it
throughout the hearings, despite mounting senatorial indignation.
7 He
said that the Constitution forbade him, a sitting Justice of the Supreme
Court, to answer the questions of Senators about Supreme Court
opinions. Thus when Senator Thurmond asked for an explanation of
the constitutional basis of the reapportionment cases, Mr. Justice
Fortas replied:
Senator, with the greatest regret I must say that we are back
where we were yesterday. I tell myself every morning before I
come here, "You are not participating in these hearings as Abe
Fortas, you are participating in this hearing as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States, with responsibility
solely to the Constitution of the United States."
5. Fortas Hearings, pt. I, at 123-64, 180-209.
6. Senator Ervin stated his position as follows:
Air. Chairman, I think I should make some preliminary statements to illustrate why
I think it is so important for Senators to know something about the constitutional
philosophy of a Supreme Court Justice, particularly a Chief Justice.
The good, wise men who fashioned the Constitution, had a most magnificent
dream. They dreamed they could enshrine the fundamentals of the government they
desired to establish and the liberties of the people they wished to secure in the
Constitution, and safely entrust the interpretation of that instrument according to
its true intent to a Supreme Court composed of mere men. They knew that some
dreams come true and others vanish, and that whether their dream would share
the one fate or the other would depend on whether the men chosen to serve as
Supreme Court Justices would be able and willing to lay aside their own notions
and interpret the Constitution according to its true intent.
It is no exaggeration to say that the existence of constitutional government in
America hinges upon the capacity and the willingness of a majority of the Supreme
Court Justices to interpret the Constitution according to its true intent. In con-
sequence, no more awesome responsibility rests upon any Senator than that of de-
termining to his own satisfaction whether or not a Presidential nominee to the
Supreme Court possesses this capacity and this willingness.
I would like to say there are a great many people in the United States who do not
feel that the Supreme Court during recent years, particularly during the past 3
years, has manifested a willingness, and an ability to interpret the Constitution
according to its true intent.
Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 107-08.
7. By the end of the hearings, Senator Ervin was referring to "what I call the 'Judicial
Fifth Amendment."' Fortas Hearings, pt. 2, at 1304.
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It is on that basis, and with the utmost respect, that I have said
to you, that I cannot respond to questions of that sort, because I
cannot and I will not be an instrument by which the separation
of powers specified in our Constitution is called into question.
And I will not and cannot discuss in this forum opinions of the
Court of which I am a member. That is my constitutional duty,
Senator, just as it would be the constitutional duty of a Senator
if he were called before a court, no matter how much he might
want to explain his vote or his opinion-it would be his constitu-
tional duty, respectfully as I am trying to do here, to decline to
answer questions that were put to him about his work in the Con-
gress.
That is the mandate of our Constitution, and that is what I am
trying to fulfill here.8
The exact scope of the constitutional duty thus said to rest on him,
Mr. Justice Fortas did not make exceedingly clear. The prohibition
apparently applied to decisions of the Supreme Court whether or
not the Justice had participated in them. He declined to discuss the
bases of Escobedo v. Illinois,9 Mallory v. United States,10 Albertson v.
S.A.C.B.,11 Baker v. Carr,12 and Pennsylvania v. Nelson 13-all decided
before he went on the Court-as well as various later decisions in
which he had taken part.14 But just how far into the past the prohibi-
8. Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 214-15.
9. 372 U.S. 478 (1964). The exchange was as follows;
Senator THURMOND. . . . Do you condone [Escobedo?
Justice FORTAS. I must make the same response, respectfully.
Senator THURMOND. A man who is guilty of murder, wrote out in detail how he
committed the crime, all about it, and yet he was turned loose, in a 5 to 4 decision
of the Supreme Court.
Justice FORTAS. I was not on the Court at that time, Senator.
Senator THURMOND. That is true, you were not. And that is the reason I thought
if you did not want to comment on the decisions you did participate in, you might
give us the benefit of your opinion for the common good, for the public good of
the people of this country, on a decision in which you did not participate.
Justice FORTAS. YOU flatter me, Senator, by suggesting that I could be of such
service, and if I could be, it is with the greatest regret that I must say that the
constitutional limitations upon me prohibit me from responding,
Senator THURMOND. So you refuse to answer?
Justice FORTAs. For the reasons stated.
Fortas Hearingt, pt. 1, at 192.
10. 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 191.
11. 382 U.S. 70 (1965); Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 208-09.
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 189-90.
13. 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 208-09.
14. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966); Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966); Harper v. State Dd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510 (1968). See Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 181, 184, 188-89, 194, 198-99, 200.01. Mr. lustice
Fortas also sat mute, having said it would be improper for him to comment, while Senator
Ervin expounded his own views on Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logal
Valley Plaza, Inc., 891 U.S. 308 (1968), NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175
(1967), Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), Duncan V. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968),
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tion extends remained uncertain. Powell v. Alabama', was apparently
forbidden territory, since the Justice discussed the case only to regret
it--"I have done something I should not have done."' 0 Yet he was
more than willing to discuss the scope of judicial review," implying
that Marbury v. Madison,'8 at least, is fair game.
The Justice was dearer about some other matters. In the first place,
he made it explicit that he was not claiming a privilege, but fulfilling
a duty. "As a person, as a lawyer, as a judge, I should enjoy this oppor-
tunity-I always do-of discussing a problem of this sort. But as a
Justice of the Supreme Court, I am under the constitutional limitation
that has been referred to."' 9 No questions arose as to Congress's power,
whether by contempt or otherwise, to punish the Justice for refusing
to answer the Senators' questions.20 The only issue was whether the
Constitution forbade his responding to questions when he knew the
answer, when he was willing to answer, and when he would have pre-
ferred-as he said many times2 -- answering to keeping silent.
Second, the constitutional duty perceived by Mr. Justice Forms was
something other than the discretion normally expected from a judge.
Reitman v. Mulkey, 587 U.S. 569 (1967), and Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.. 392 US. 409
(1968). Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 124, 126-53.
15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 173. The context makes clear that Mr. Justice Fortas's
regret was constitutional in nature. Compare the discussion of Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S.
231 (1966):
Senator THuRmon. In my judgment, it is preferable for a Governor to be chosen
by popular election. Yet I am unable to find a requirement to this effect in the
Constitution. Would you consider your dissent in Fortson v. Morris to be an example
of translating a personal preference into a constitutional requirement?
Justice FoRTAs. I most certainly would not-but I should not say that. I must
stand on the constitutional position. I cannot respond to that, Senator.
Senator THwi om I thought you did respond.
Justice FORTAS. I am sorry. It was an inadvertence.
Senator THrMOND. Well, maybe we need more inadvertent answers here this
morning.
Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 189.
17. Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 105-06, 110, 116-21.
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 181.
20. There seems little doubt that use of the contempt power would have been in-
appropriate in any case. Just as a President may bar congressional access to administrative
files under the doctrine of executive privilege, see Younger, Congressional Investigations
and Executive Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 20 U. Prrr. L. Rui. 755
(1959), a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court may claim a privilege to refuse to answer
Senators' questions. 'Mr. Justice Fortas himself appeared to rely on the privilege in refusing
to appear for further questioning by the committee in September. Fortas Hearings, pt.
2, at 1285. The exact scope of this judicial privilege need not be considered here, though
it would no doubt cover all the matters Mr. Justice Fortas declined comment on. The
point is that at the earlier hearings Mr. Justice Fortas made no such claim of priiilegc;
he spoke rather in terms of a duty he could not evade if he wished. On the distinction of
privilege and duty, see Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Juridical
Reasoning, 23 YArE L.J. 16, 28-44 (1913).
21. Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 122, 124, 173, 181-82, 185-86, 189. 200.
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Considerations of judicial propriety, of course, require a judge to re-
frain from comment on matters that are sub judice, or likely soon to
be so. 2 2 But this duty extends to all comments on such matters, no mat-
ter where they are made: if a judge is not at liberty to discuss a pending
case before one group, he is not at liberty to discuss it before another.
The constitutional duty resting on Mr. Justice Fortas, however, applied
uniquely to comments made in the Congress of the United States;
2
1
it left him free to comment on past cases in lectures to universities or
colleges or other "appropriate groups," or to address himself to the
general public by means of books or other writings.
24
Finally, at no time did Mr. Justice Fortas contend that the informa-
tion sought by the opposing Senators was irrelevant to their duty of
passing judgment upon him. He agreed "absolutely" with the sugges.
tion of Senator Thurmond that members of the Senate were entitled
to know what his philosophy was if they were going to consider him for
Chief Justice.2 5 But he maintained that such information had to come
from his published opinions and writings and from the course of his
professional life; he was forbidden to assist the Senators by answering
questions.26
Indeed, Mr. Justice Fortas could hardly have denied that his views
and legal philosophy were relevant to his confirmation. It is true that
Alexander Hamilton believed that the senatorial power of confirma-
tion would extend only to the rejection of nominees lacking even the
22. See In re Requests to Judges in Chancery for Advisory Opinions, 101 N.J. Eq. 9,
137 A. 151 (1927); Crawford v. Ferguson, 5 Okla. Crim. 377, 115 P. 278 (1911); Wilson v.
Hinckley, I Kirby 199 (Conn. 1787); 48 C.J.S. Judges § 89 (1955). Cf. pp. 707-08 in Ira.
23. Senator THURMOND. Well, now, how is it that you can publish a book and express
views, and then when that is done, you can elaborate here on such a Inatiitel,
whereas if you have not published a book, you refuse to elaborate here?
Justice FoRTAs. Senator, because of the problem of separation of powers, I lepeat
again-I do not like this situation as a man. I am not that kind. I like debate and
discussion. The Constitution, so far as Members of the Congress are concerned, says
that they shall not be held to answer in any other place for their votes or opinions
while exercising their duties. In my opinion, that principle as applied to the Members
of Congress is a fundamental one. It is the foundation of our system of government.
The correlative, Senator, in my judgment, is true of judges. Judges may not be held
to answer-which is very broad, has been construed by the Supreme Court in the
case of Members of Congress very broadly-they shall not be held to answer before any
other branch of the Government for their views. And it is that principle that Is
fundamental to our tripartite division of government, and it is that principle which
I being sworn to uphold the Constitution, am doing my level best in these trying
circumstances to uphold.
Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 185.
24. "I have also expressed my views . . . to law schools and college audiences before
whom I have been invited to lecture. And that is not a violation of a division of powels
within the Government under our Constitution." Fortas Hearings, pt. I, at 185.
25. Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 182.
26. Id.
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"appearances of merit,"27 and that supporters of nominees to the Su-
preme Court contend that the Senate has done its job when it finds
that the nominee is a competent lawyer, and a man of honor.2
- But for
at least the last fifty years, it has been the practice for Senators to vote
against the confirmation of candidates whose legal views they disap-
prove.29 This is not the custom on appointments to the executive
27. See THlE FEDERAiisT No. 66, at 449-50 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
28. Mr. President, what are the tests that the Senate should apply to nomines
for office? I have known of only two outstanding tests that it has been the custom
of the Senate to require. First, has the man character and integrity and honesty?
Second, has he ability?
81 CONG. REc. 9087 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Connally). Whatever the custom of the
Senate, it had been the custom of Senator Connally (here supporting Mr. Justice Black)
to require more: he voted against the confirmation of Chief Justice Hughes and of
Judge Parker because of their economic views, as one of the Senator's colleagues pointed
out. Id. 9087-88 (remarks of Sen. Burke). See also 72 CONG. Rae. 8118-19 (1930) (remarks
of Sen. Fess).
29. J. HARu~s, THE ADviCE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 302-05 (1953); 2 G. HAMNES.
THE SENATE OF TnE UN=rE STATES 755-60 (1938). Consider also the following:
[A]dmitting for the sake of argument that [Charles Evans Hughes] is the greatest
lawyer in the United States, should we, for that reason alone, put him on the
Supreme Bench? Are we going to consider nothing but ability? If that is all, then
it is possible to go to Sing Sing and get candidates to fill the bill. It is possible to
go to any State or Federal prison in the United States and find men who are able
lawyers; and if they are not found there that is no reason why nome of them should
not be there. [Laughter.]
In my judgment, Mr. President, there are other qualifications necessary. Without
speaking in disrespect of any man, I do not believe a man is fit to go on the
Supreme Bench who has never had any opportunity to sympathize or to associate
with those who toil and those who labor. Since Mr. Hughes retired from the Su-
preme Bench and after he got through running for Presidency, he has lived with
those of wealth; he has been surrounded by the luxury of combined wealth.
His vision has extended only to that limited area which is circumscribed by yellow
gold. He is not to blame for that; I am not criticizing him for it; I am perfectly
willing that he should live that kind of a life. I am perfectly willing that he Should
work for rich clients. I have not fault to find with that; but I am not willing that
there should be transferred from that kind of surroundings one who shall sit at the
head of the greatest judicial tribunal in the world; I am not willing to say that
that kind of man, regardless of his ability, should go on the Supreme Bench.
While I have nothing in the world against him, yet, in my judgment, the man who
has never felt the pinch of hunger and who has never known what it was to be
cold, who has never associated with those who have earned their bread by the sweat
of their faces, but who has lived in luxury, who has never wanted for anything that
money could buy, is not fit to sit in judgment in a contest between organized wealth
and those who toil.
72 CONG. Rm 3566 (1930) (remarks of Sen. Norris).
Mr. WVATEMrAN. I know very well the Senator has declared upon tie floor here
that Judge Parker is an utter and absolute impersonality, so far as he is concerned.
That is likewise true so far as I am concerned. I do not know the gentlemen:
I know nothing about him except what has been brought out in this debate. I am
speaking, however, from a little different platform than is the Senator from Idaho.
I look upon the Constitution as a document that is amendable only in a certain way
provided in the instrument itself, and I think that is the way in which it should
be amended.
Air. BoRatH. I agree with that.
Mr. WATERMAN. I do not think it should be amended by the method of importuning
or threatening any candidate for office or by criticizing the courts or b) criticizing a
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branch, which the Senate normally opposes only in a case amounting
to incompetence or lack of integrity.30 The nominations of Justices
Brandeis,3 1 Black,82 and Stewart 3 ran into serious opposition from
those who thought the candidates were too liberal; while Justices But-
ler,3 4 Stone,3 5 and Hughes30 were opposed as allied to conservative
interests.3 7 In 1930, President Hoover's nomination of Judge John J.
judge or by criticizing a decision or by bringing about a changed opinion in a
politican [sic] forum, as I think we are doing at the present time.
Mr. BORAH. But the Senator will agree with me that there Is a limit. For Instance,
if a nominee should entertain communistic views-
Mr. WATERMAN. I would certainly be against him.
Mr. BORAH. Yes. So there is a limit. It is just a question as to what shall be the
limit.
72 CONG. REc. 8354 (1930) (remarks of Sens. Borah & Waterman); cf. 89 CoNG. REc. 681
(1943) (remarks of Sen. Langer).
30. J. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 258-301, 325-55 (1953); L.ROGERS, THE AMERICAN SENATE 28-30 (1925); 2 G. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF TIlE UNITED
STATES 761-64 (1938). And compare:
Here in the Senate there has been a rather well-established practice to the effect
that if a President nominates a person of character, honor, and ability for appoint-ment, then there is no sound basis for withholding Senate confirmation. So far asappointments in the executive branch of the Government are concerned, this Iscertainly the general rule, and is one that I ordinarily follow. However, as to judicialappointments, especially at the very top, it has no application whatsoever; and,
further, it is dangerous to the judiciary, as an independent branch of our Govern.
ment.
101 CONG. REC. 2830 (1955) (remarks of Sen. Stennis).
There is some evidence, moreover, that the closer scrutiny given to Supreme Court
appointments may reflect the original intention of the authors of the Constitution. TheConvention agreed early in its deliberations that the Senate was to select judges of theSupreme Court. Other offices of the government, including lower federal judgeships,
were to be filled by the President without any necessity for senatorial confirnation.Successive attempts to transfer the power to appoint Supreme Court Justices to thePresident were defeated, and only a last-minute compromise resulted in the presentprovision by which the President nominates, and with the advice and consent of theSenate appoints, both judges and other officials. The earlier understanding seems to havebeen preserved in the actual practice of the Senate. See THE DEaATES OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 39-40, 56 (G. Hunt & J. Brown ed. 1920); cf. 2 TIlE REcoRws oF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 136, 301 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).31. See Hearings on the Nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to be an Associate Justiceof the Supreme Court of the United States, Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1916). The best account is A. MASON,
BRANDEIS: A FRE MAN'S LIFE 465-508 (1956).
32. 81 CONC. REC. 8964-68, 9068-88, 9096-9103 (1937). Though a few Senators coin-plained of Senator Black's erstwhile membership in the Ku Klux Klan, most opposition
centered on his vigorous investigation of the telegraph companies, and his support of
President Roosevelt's court-packing plan.
33. 105 CONG. REc. 7452-72 (1959).
34. See D. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE iS APPOINTED 108-41 (1964). Neithercommittee hearings nor Senate proceedings in executive session were made public until
1929.
35. 66 CONG. REc. 3032-57 (1925). Senator Norris, the leader of the opposition toStone, later recanted. 87 CoNG. REC. 5618 (1941). See generally A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE
STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAw 181-200 (1961).
36. 72 CONG. REC. 3553-91 (1930); see note 29 supra.
37. Scattered opposition has greeted various other nominations. Thus Senator Tydingswaged a one-man crusade against Justice Jackson's confirmation: as Attorney General,Jackson had refused to use the criminal libel statute to punish some of Drew Pearson'scomments about the Senator, see Hearings on the Nomination of Robert H. Jaekion to
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Parker to the Supreme Court was rejected by the Senate after progres-
sive Senators, led by Norris, Borah, and Wheeler, attacked Parker's
decision granting an injunction against a union seeking to break a
yellow-dog contract 8 Thus, it is well established that the Senate will
inquire into the legal views of a Supreme Court nominee.3
9
Since he accepted as legitimate the Senators' interest in his legal
philosophy, Mr. Justice Fortas was forced to look elsewhere in the Con-
stitution for the source of his asserted duty not to answer their ques-
tions. In this connection, he placed great reliance on the speed and
debate clause.40 The Constitution "expressly" provides, he said, that
members of Congress shall not be called to answer in any other place
for their votes or statements on the floor. "And I think that probably it
is true that the correlative of that applies to the Court."
41
The shortest answer to this contention is the maxim, expressio unius,
be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before a Subcomlim.
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-69 (1941); 87 Coxo. REG.
5830-41; 5843-45 (1941). Mr. justice Douglas was opposed because he had no "substantial
record on the subject of civil liberties," 84 CONG. Rr. 3711 (1939) (remarks of Sen.
Frazier); Justice Rutledge, because the Court needed more practicing law)ers, 89 COxG.
RGe. 681 (1943) (remarks of Sen. Langer); and Mr. Chief Justice Warren, because federal
patronage to North Dakota was insufficient. 100 CoNG. Rae. 2044-47, 2358-64 (19i3).
38. U1MV v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927).
See IV. BuRmus, TBm SENATE REjaErs A JUDGE (1962); Hearing on the Nomination of Hon.
John J. Parker to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 71st Cong., 1st Scsi. (1930);
72 CONG. RE. 8475-87 (1930).
39. There have been a number of objections made to nominees for the Supreme
Bench, but objections have never been made in our history, so far as I know, on the
ground that the nominee was a man lacking in character or lacking in integrity. The
objections have always been raised because of the views he entertamed with reference
to some public question.
72 CONG. REG. 8353 (1930) (remarks of Sen. Borah).
Once it is candidly recognized that [the Justices] whole outlook on life, their freedom
from fear, their experience and their capacity to transcend their experience, determine
their decisions, it follows inevitably that these qualities will become pertinent
matters of inquiry before a man is put on the Supreme Bench for life.
It is noteworthy that Presidents so unlike as Lincoln and Roosevelt should have
deemed relevant the general direction of mind of prospective members of the Court
toward public issues. Surely the men who wield the power of life and death over
the political decisions of legislatures and executives should be subjected to the
most vigorous scrutiny before being given that power. Public opinion, the President.
and the Senate should all have a lively understanding of what the appointment of
a Supreme Court Justice means.
Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Public, TnE FoRUit 329, 334 (1930). There are,
of course, those who believe-precisely because of the Senate's power to inquire into
matters other than the nominee's honesty and legal ability-that the whole confirmation
power is unwise, at least as to judges. "After long experience and dose observation I
have reached the conclusion that senatorial meddling with judicial nominations is an
unmixed evil. . . . An informed and vigilant public opinion and a President who
is responsive to it are the surest guarantees of wise selection. When the Senate takes
to weighing imponderables it is very apt to tamper with the scales." G. ParEn, F&,ttu.v
QuAmRrts: TiE PPEsmENT, T SENATE, THE House 89, 92 (1931).
40. "[A]nd for any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and Representatives]
shall not be questioned in any other Place." U.S. Co.'%sr. art. I, § 6.
41. Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 122.
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excIusio alterius. A provision appearing in article I, and applicable by
its terms only to members of Congress, probably does not also govern-
even by implication-members of the Supreme Court, whose duties
are set out in Article III. The history of the speech and debate clause,
moreover, reveals that it was designed to correct a single, specific evil-
the persecution of Members of Parliament by the King's judges.42 It is
extraordinarily unlikely that a provision intended specifically to pro-
tect legislators against judges should also have the effect of protecting
judges against legislators.
Even if the clause applied to judges, moreover, it would furnish no
support to Mr. Justice Fortas's position. The aim of the speech and
debate clause was to avoid the civil and criminal liability to which legis-
lators might otherwise be subject as a result of votes or statements in
Congress.43 It creates at best a privilege: it frees the legislator from
liability, but leaves him free, if he so desires, to explain his vote to his
heart's content-either in a court of law or elsewhere. The suggestion
that a Senator involved in a lawsuit would be forbidden from explain-
ing his vote is plainly wrong: the clause would do no more than leave
his choice unfettered by the threat of civil or criminal penalties. 4
More telling than Mr. Justice Fortas's argument based on the speech
and debate clause was the appeal to the authority of Justice Frank-
furter.45 The latter, whose wonted deference to legislative judgment
apparently did not extend to the matter of his own qualifications, had
been asked to testify in response to a remarkable parade of grotesques
and crackpots opposed to his confirmation.40 Professor Frankfurter con-
sented, but he was understandably unhappy:
42. See 6 IV. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 231 (2d cd. 1936); C. W'rri,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE (1921); Yankwich, The Immunity of
Congressional Speech-Its Origin, Meaning and Scope, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960, 96161, 966
(1951); cf. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 A. & E. 1, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (Q.B. 1839); Coffin v.
Coffin, 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
43. See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177-78 (1966).
44. A bold man might attempt to rationalize the Fortas position by arguing that the
Senate was in some sense punishing the Justice by a denial of confirmation-that the
refusal to consent to his nomination was the equivalent of the civil or criminal liability
that the clause prohibits. The analogy would be to United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S.
169 (1966), a recent case construing the speech and debate clause. There the Supreme Court
held that a speech on the floor of the House could not form an element of t cause of
action against a Congressman for conspiracy to defraud the United States. It could be
contended that the Senators' questions to Mr. Justice Fortas were similarly objectionable
since the subject-matter to which they were addressed (the Justice's opinions and legal
philosophy) could not form a proper basis for denial of confirmation. But this argu-
ment runs directly afoul of Mr. Justice Fortas's concession that his legal opinions and
philosophy were a valid basis for denying him confirmation.
45. Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 123.
46. See Hearings on the Nomination of Felix Frankfurter to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court, Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong.,
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While I believe that a nominee's record should be thoroughly
scrutinized by this committee, I hope you will not think it pre-
sumptuous on my part to suggest that neither such examination
nor the best interests of the Supreme Court will be helped by the
personal participation of the nominee himself. My attitude and
outlook on relevant matters have been fully expressed over a
period of years and are easily accessible. I should think it not
only bad taste, but inconsistent with the duties of the office for
which I have been nominated for me to attempt to supplement
my past record with present declarations.4: 7
As a basis for Mr. Justice Fortas's refusal to answer questions, of course,
the quotation was not precisely in point. It did not refer specifically
to the Constitution nor to separation of powers (as indeed Professor
Frankfurter could not have, since not even the Harvard Law School
is a fourth branch of government), but it did suggest that there is some
special impropriety, rooted in the nature of judicial office, in answering
senatorial inquiries during confirmation hearings. To that extent it
was useful.
The difficulty with the Frankfurter quotation is that it addresses
itself to a question that was open in 1939, but is now settled contrary
to the position taken by Professor Frankfurter. That question is
whether it is appropriate, under any circumstances, for a Supreme
Court nominee to appear before a Senate committee. Until 1925, when
Harlan F. Stone appeared to answer charges that he had misused his
authority as Attorney General in the prosecution of Senator Burton K.
Wheeler,4 s no Supreme Court nominee had come before a Senate com-
mittee. Frankfurter was only the second nominee to appear,
40 and
Robert H. Jackson the third.0 All three appearances were perceived as
1st Sess. (1939). Opposition witnesses included the National Director of the Constitu-
tional Crusaders of America, who claimed to represent "consumers, taxpayers, the un-
employed and old-age pensions; everybody but the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L.," id. 3; 'Wade
E. Cooper, who thought Frankfurter had "fine qualifications," id. 28, but who felt his
bank had been destroyed by the Supreme Court in violation of the ninth amendment.
id. 24; a lady who believed that Justice Brandeis sponsored colleges "where they teadc
communism and have free love and nudist colonies," id. 47, though.se admited thatshe
couldn't keep " all those radicals on my mind," id. 45; and a retired Spanish-American
War veteran concerned by Frankfurters connection with the International Red Cross.
id. 92.
47. Id. 107-08.
48. See A. MASON, HAR.AN Fisa SToNE: PiLLAR oF THE LAw 195-98 (1961).
49. As he pointed out. Hearings on the Nomination of Felix Franlfurter, supra note
46 at 107.
50. Hearings on the Nomination of Robert H. Jackson to be an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States, Before a Subcomnin. of the Senate Coim. on the
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941). Jackson's failure as Attorney General to prosecute
Drew Pearson for allegedly libelous statements about Senator Tydings was in issue. Cf.
note 37 supra.
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rather special casesal and as late as 1949, when Sherman Minton de-
dined to appear before the Judiciary Committee, the Senate concluded
that there was no reason for him to do so.52 Commentators agreed that
personal appearances were inappropriate and unwise. 3 But in recent
years the rule has changed. Mr. Chief Justice Warren did not appear
before a Senate committee, but every subsequent nominee has done
so, 54 and none asserted the old doctrine as to the impropriety of such
an appearance. 55
51. Stone's and Jackson's because they involved charges of malfeasance in office asAttorney General; Frankfurter's because of the scurrility and virulence of the right-wing
attack on him.
52. The Judiciary Committee had requested Judge Minton to appear before it onSeptember 26, 1949. Rather than testifying, he sent a letter to the committee quotingJustice Frankfurter's statement, p. 705 supra, and calling their attention to the 'seriousquestions of propriety and policy" involved. The Judiciary Committee then voted torecommend the nomination favorably without further hearings. See 95 CoN. Rc. 13795
(1949).
When the nomination came to the floor a week later, Senator Morse, with the supportof Senator Ferguson, moved to recommit, so that the nominee could appear before thecommittee and new evidence be taken. 95 CONG. REc. 13797 (1949). Senator Morse indicatedhe would vote for confirmation of Judge Minton, but added:We shall do a disservice to the judicial system of this country tonight if we let theprecedent of the Minton letter stand. I say that the Senate of the United Statestonight must make very clear the fact that it puts its stamp of approval and sanc-tion on the principle that when the President of the United States nominates a manto the United States Supreme Court there is nothing improper about calling thenominee before the Judiciary Committee for an inquiry into his qualifications. Ifwe do not make that clear tonight, great disservice will be done this country.If we are able to come to grips with the principle of the obligation of the Senateunder the advice-and-consent clause of the Constitution, I do not see how we canjustify in effect supporting Judge Minton in his letter, which, when we boll It alldown, leaves only the principle for which he contends, that a nominee for theUnited States Supreme Court should not be called before the committee on theJudiciary for inquiry because it might violate the proprieties. I say that is a dan-gerous precedent, and I say we have to consider these matters from the standpointof the principles, and not of the individuals concerned.95 CONG. REc. 13798 (1949) (remarks of Sen. Morse). But the motion was defeated45-21, after opponents had argued that it would "serve no purpose to call him beforethe committee." 95 CONG. Rac. 13799 (1949) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson). Several Sen-ators pointed out that, before his appointment to the Seventh Circuit, Judge Mintonhad been a Senator, and was known to the membership. Compare Senator Connally'sspeech after Senator Bridges had requested hearings on the nomination of Senator Black
to the Supreme Court:
Does the Senator mean that we shall be obliged to have long and protractedhearings, and let everyone who wants to come before the committee make a stumspeech on the subject; or should the committee, when it has satisfied itself with
respect to the nomination, report to the Senate?
Hearings are for the information of the committees, not for the purpose ofpublic amusement; not to have a legislative rodeo so that everybody may come inand have a good time. Hearings are had to obtain information.
81 CONG. REc. 8964 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Connally).
53. J. HARRIS, THE ADvrCE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 246 (1953).54. Hearings on Nomination of John M. Harlan, of New York, to be Associate Justiceof the Supreme Court of the United States, Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm.on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1955); Hearings on Nomination of WilliamJoseph Brennan, Jr., of New Jersey, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court ofthe United States, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong,, 1st Sess.17 (1957); Hearing on Nomination of Charles E. Whittaker, of Missouri, to be Associate
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In place of the old doctrine that any personal appearance was im-
proper has grown up a new doctrine, similar to the one governing
judicial utterances generally. A Supreme Court nominee is free to dis-
cuss legal philosophy or opinions, but must shy away from specific com-
ment on situations presented in cases pending, or soon to be pending,
before the Court. The distinction is generally one between discussion
of past cases, which is permitted, and discussion of future cases, which
is not, with the caveat that where the law is unsettled, discussion of
past cases is restricted by the fact that hypotheticals based on them will
almost certainly appear as cases on the Court's docket in the immediate
future. This new doctrine, with its distinction of past and prospective
cases, has been applied and endorsed by all those who have come before
the Judiciary Committee. 58 Mr. Justice Fortas himself, when he was
nominated to be an Associate Justice, recognized that Supreme Court
nominees should speak only with "great diffidence" about matters
likely to come before the Court,57 but did not feel it improper to out-
line in general terms his views on the problems involved in Escobedo
v. Illinois,58 then a matter of controversy. 9 During the more recent
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1957); Hearing on Nomination of Byron R. White,
of Colorado, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1962); Hearings on Nomina-
tion of Arthur J. Goldberg, of Illinois, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
23 (1962); Hearing on Nomination of Abe Fortas, of Tennessee, to be an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1965); Hearings on Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, of
New York, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. Be-
fore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 25, 65, 159, 187 (1967).
The Stewart confirmation hearings have not been printed. See N. Y. Times, April 10,
1959, at 1, col. 5; id. 14, col. 4.
55. Compare Senator Hruska's comments at the hearings on Justice Goldberg:
I first of all want to say that I am personally gratified at your appearance
here, and pleased that you are here on this kind of an occasion. I would like to
reflect, just a little bit, that it was not always this way with nominees for Supreme
Court justiceships. If my memory serves me right, it was the man whose place you
are taking [Justice Frankfurter] who, on the occasion when he was invited to appear
personally, took exception to the procedure, and thought that it ias just a little
bit out of order.
Of course, that has long been worn out as an objection or as any reflection on
any nominee for the justiceship. And so I want to say I am gratified at your
being here.
Hearings on Nomination of Arthur J. Goldberg, supra note 54, at 10.
56. See, e.g., Hearings on Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, supra note 54, at 9;
Hearings on Nomination of William Joseph Brennan, supra note 54, at 18-20; Hearings
on Nomination of John AL Harlan, supra note 54, at 188-40.
57. Hearing on Nomination of Abe Fortas, supra note 54, at 42.
58. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
59. Mr. Justice Fortas commented on a highly publicized exchange of letters between
Attorney General Katzenbach and Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia
Circuit concerning the proper balancing of the defendant's interest in his rights and
society's interest in restraining criminals. Hearing on Nomination of Abe Fortas,
supra note 54, at 41-43.
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Fortas hearings, the questioning Senators referred to the established
practice and insisted that their questions involved past cases, rather
than matters likely to come before the Court.r0
Past practice, then, gives no support to the idea that a Supreme Court
nominee may not respond to questions, providing he does not discuss
pending cases. It gives equally little support to the idea propounded
by Mr. Justice Fortas, that additional restrictions are imposed on the
nominee by virtue of his being a sitting Justice.6 ' True, there is no
exact parallel to the situation of Mr. Justice Fortas: neither of the two
previous Chief Justices promoted from Associate Justiceships appeared
before the Judiciary Committee. 2 But none of the three recent recess
appointees 63 to the Supreme Court relied on any doctrine such as the
one advanced by Mr. Justice Fortas, though they too were sitting as
Justices of the Supreme Court when they were questioned by the Senate
Judiciary Committee. 4 Mr. Justice Stewart, indeed, did not hesitate
to discuss a recent, and controversial, Supreme Court case: in response
to a question from Senator McClellan, he allowed that the legal and
sociological basis of Brown v. Board of EducationG5 was "substantially"
in accordance with his own views.60
Moreover, since separation of powers is one basis of the restriction
which Mr. Justice Fortas said is imposed on a sitting Justice," the
restriction should apply equally to any federal judge promoted to the
Supreme Court.68 Such at least was the position taken by Judge Thorn-
berry,69 who may fairly be presumed to have discussed with his would-
60. Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 122, 181.
61. See Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 100-01, 122, 181, 214-15.
62. Edward D. White in 1910; Harlan F. Stone in 1941. Nor did Charles Evans
Hughes, who had been an Associate Justice from 1910-16, and %%*as ppointed Chief
Justice in 1930. But his decision in the Shreveport Rate Case, 284 U.S. 342 (1914).
which Senator Glass claimed "extirpated every remaining right that any State had
over intrastate commerce," played a part in tie debate over his later confirmation
as Chief Justice. 72 CONG. RFc. 8373 (1930).
63. Justices Brennan, Whittaker, and Stewart. The last previous nominee to take his
seat on the Court without being confirmed was Justice Benjamin Curtis in 1851.
64. See note 54 supra.
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66. N.Y. Times, April 10, 1959, at 14, col. 4.
67. See p. 698 supra & pp. 710-I1 infra.
68. The judicial power is vested not only in the Supreme Court, but also in "such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.' US.
CONST. art. III, § 1.
69. The following colloquy occurred:
Senator ERviN. Well, you do agree with me in my view that Members of the
U.S. Senate who are required to pass upon appointments to Supreme Court Jus-
ticeships have a perfect right, indeed an absolute duty, to ascertain tie constitutional
philosophy of any person for that position?
Judge THORNBERRY. I certainly do, sir.
Senator ERvIN. But as I take it from your statement, that you are unvilling.
because of your belief of either the limitations or the privileges of a judicial office,
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be colleague the scope of their duty not to respond to questions, and
who declined to explain or expand upon his decision in United States
v. Texas.70 Yet federal judges previously nominated to the Supreme
Court have shown no reluctance to discuss with Senators past cases in
which they participated, provided always that they could avoid ones
likely to be pending before them.
Mr. Justice Marshall expressly stated his willingness to answer ques-
tions about opinions he had written as a judge in the Second Circuit,
providing they were not "cases that will come before me later.""
t Jus-
tice Whittaker, asked about an Eighth Circuit case denying relief to a
professor fired for refusing to appear before the Senate Internal Se-
curity Subcommittee, did not think it improper to justify his reasoning.
He said that he had "declared no new law. I followed the adjudicated
cases." 72 Similarly, Judge John J. Parker, under attack for his decision
in the Red Jacket Coal Company case,
73 explained in a letter to Senator
Overman that he had only followed controlling precedents.
4
Hence the practices of earlier confirmation hearings furnish little
support to Mr. Justice Fortas's position. Yet precedent and the speech
and debate clause were not the only broken strings to the judicial vio-
linist's bow.75 He relied also on more general notions of the separation
of powers, 76 a concept with the useful characteristic of being insuffi-
ciently defined to permit effective rebuttal. Nor did the Justice feel
obliged to flesh out the exact contours of the doctrine.
He might have meant simply that when the Constitution entrusts a
question to one branch of the government, which resolves the question
in a particular way, it is improper for a member of that branch to
inform the other branches of the reasons underlying the decision. Some
to explain your own constitutional philosophy as expounded by )ou in a decision
you wrote.
Judge THORNBERRY. I would not say judicial privilege, Senator. If I may say-I
must say, Senator, that I believe that under the separation of powers, under the
provisions of the Constitution, under my judicial oath, after once hasing expressed
my views for a court, I ought not to try to amend it, take back, add to. or any
thing else.
Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 256.
70. 252 F. Supp. 284 (W.D. Tex. 1966). The decision, by a three-judge panel. struck
down Texas's poll tax as unconstitutional.
71. Hearings on Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, supra note 54, at 56.
72. Hearing on Nomination of Charles E. Whittaher, supra note 54, at 33.
73. 18 F.2d 839 (4th Cir. 1927); see pp. 702-03 supra.
74. 72 CoNG. REc. 7793 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Overman). During the Fortas hearings,
Senator Ervin recalled that Mr. Justice Stewart had "made no objection to answering
questions" about "decisions he had written as a circuit judge." Fortas Hearings, pt. 2.
at 1304. The Stewart confirmation hearings have not been printed. See note 54 supra.
75. See Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 168, 176.
76. Id. 185, 214-15.
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such theory would appear to be the basis of Mr. Justice Fortas's conten-
tion that "no matter how much he might want to" it would be im-
proper for him to explain the reapportionment cases, since he would
thereby become an "instrument by which the separation of powers
would be called into question." 77 But such a doctrine seems extraordi-
narily broad. The power to recognize foreign governments is as clearly
committed to the President7 8 as the power to overturn statutes is to
the Supreme Court, yet no one would suggest that this fact alone makes
it improper for the Secretary of State to explain a particular recogni-
tion decision to the Senate.79
It is thus likely that Mr. Justice Fortas's reliance on separation of
powers is to be taken, not with reference to doctrines generally applica-
ble to the relationship of the three co-ordinate branches of the govern-
ment, but in terms of constraints implicit in the idea of judicial, as
opposed to executive or legislative, power.
Support for this conclusion can be drawn from the Justice's com-
ments at the only point in the hearings where he discussed the policy
considerations that might underlie the constitutional duty he perceived:
I cannot address myself to the question that you have asked be-
77. Id. 215.
78. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 328 (1937).
79. A claim of privilege would of course be a different matter. Cf. note 20 sn pra.
Cases like United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), are not to the contrary. In
Morgan the Supreme Court held that a district court judge had erred in overruling
the Secretary of Agriculture's objections to the taking of his deposition in a suit chal-
lenging his determination of a reasonable rate under the Packers and Stockyards Act,
7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (1964). Courts and administrative agencies, the opinion said, "arc
to be deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate independence
of each should be respected by the other." 813 U.S. at 422.
But Morgan was addressed to a problem different from the one involved in the
Fortas hearings. The Secretary had, by objecting to the questions, made a claim of
privilege: unlike Mr. Justice Fortas, he indicated that he did not wish to answer. Tile
Government made no claim that any duty not to testify rested on the Secretary; In-
stead it suggested that the case would have been different had the Secretary "volun.
tarily submitted to examination as a witness in his own behalf." Brief for Appellant
at 32.
To the extent, morevoer, that the decision in Morgan was based on the finding thatthe Secretary was exercising quasi-judicial power, and that "an examination of a judge
would be destructive of judicial responsibility," 313 U.S. at 422, it rested on established
principles of appellate review. It is settled that when the decision of an inferior tribunal
is embodied in a record regular on its face, the reviewing court will not probe
into motives that may underlie the record but are not patent. This principle applies
variously to jurymen, Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892); arbitrators, Duke
of Buccleuch v. Metropolitan Bd. of Works, L.R. 5 H.L. 418, 457, 462 (1872); judges,
Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276 (1904); and tax assessors, Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v.
Babcock, 204 U.S. 583 (1907). The effect of Morgan was merely to apply this long-
standing doctrine to review of the quasi-judicial decisions of administrative agencies,
Grounded as it is in the necessities of appellate review of lower-tribunal determina.
tions, the rule has no particular application to the situation presented by the Fortas
hearings.
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cause I could not possibly address myself to it without discussing
theory and principle. And the theory and principle would most
certainly be involved in situations that we have to face.
Also, I could not discuss a case decided by us without discussing
theory and practice, and thereby laying open the possibility of
petitions for rehearing, thereby laying open the possibility of ref-
erences to prejudgments on my part, thereby laying open the
possibility that litigants and their counsel would use some remarks
that I might have made here in the course of the presentation of
their case. 0
But if the duty resting on the Justice is, as he suggested, rooted in the
difficulties of trying cases and sitting in judgment, it is hard to see why
these difficulties are not fully resolved by the established rule entitling
any nominee to refrain from discussing situations that are likely to
come before him for decision."' It is simply not true that every discus-
sion of theory, principle, or practice involves a real danger of prejudg-
ing future cases. When there is a danger of prejudgment, the tradi-
tional rule-as previous nominees recognized-fully protects the Court,
the Justices, and potential litigants.
82
The Fortas doctrine, on the other hand, prevents a Justice from
speaking out even when there is no danger of prejudging a future case.
Such a result seems unfortunate in view of the relationship between
the Supreme Court and the people. As an oligarchic institution in a
generally democratic society, the Court's prestige, power, and author-
ity all depend ultimately on its ability to communicate dearly and
convincingly to the American people the worth of the constitutional
principles which it applies and the manner in which those principles
inform its decisions.83 Hearings on the confirmation of a Supreme
80. Fortas Hearings, pt. 1, at 181-82.
81. Fear of petitions for rehearing, in particular, seems exaggerated. A case in which
such a petition may still be filed should simply be treated as a pending case for pur-
poses of the rule against comment.
82. It is conceivable that in a limited class of situations a sitting Justice of the
Supreme Court might have a duty to assert, not his own privilege, but that of his
colleagues-just as an attorney is under a duty to assert his client's privilege. This
would certainly be the case in regard to inquiries as to the philosophy of other jus-
tices, or as to the course of discussions in conference, for example. But the Senators
asked no questions along these lines, Mr. Justice Fortas never based his duty on such
a principle, and it is hard to see why it should be applicable at all to the t)pe of
question put to him-interrogation concerning not some other justice's philosophy
but his own.
83. On this point the commentators have achieved an unaccustomed unanimity. See.
e.g., A. BicKEL, THE LEAsr DAGous BRANCH 95 (1962); E. Rosrowv, THE Sovn.-c.
PREOGATrVE 88 (1962); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HAuv. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A
Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. RE'. 1, 4 (1959). Mr. Justice Fortas himself
thought that communications between Court and people ought to be improved. Fortas
Hearings, pt. 1, at 112.
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Court nominee attract wide public attention and provide a convenient
forum from which the teaching function of a Justice of the Supreme
Court may be exercised. The Supreme Court decisions for which Mr.
Justice Fortas was attacked are considered by most legal observers to
be fair and right, yet they are the subject of considerable public mis-
understanding and abuse. Mr. Justice Fortas is an excellent judge, a
practiced speaker, a skilled advocate, and a former law professor. By
declining to defend the Court, he missed an opportunity to educate
the people, and perhaps even the Senate.
712
